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This study seeks to determine how certain social situations cannot help but influence
subjectivity and family ties. The Keynesian age encouraged and promoted a relatively
stable socioeconomic matrix based on a probable future and achievable promise. The
installation of a family model related to protective parents who were capable of caring
for and protecting their children has been observed. Adolescent subjectivity is constructed
based on parameters like generational confrontation and growth, and happiness before
the possibility of exercising autonomy. On the other hand, neoliberalism produces a
“retraction” of social spaces, dismisses the future, and feelings of instability and insecurity
are prevalent, making the family model a “structure that overwhelms parents.” Adolescent
subjectivity seems incapable of executing generational confrontation, predominantly
showing a desire to “protect” the family (“exacerbated messiah complex”) by means of
a fantasy that acts as a “threading scene” capable of annulling the search for autonomy
and growth. 
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Este trabajo busca puntualizar cómo determinadas situaciones sociales no pueden dejar
de incidir en la subjetividad  y  los vínculos familiares. La modernidad keynesiana alentaba
y proponía una matriz  socioeconómica que era relativamente estable, con instauración
de un porvenir probable y declaración de una promesa alcanzable. Se puede observar
la instauración de un modelo familiar relacionable a la experiencia de padres amparadores,
capaces de cuidar y proteger. Desde allí la subjetividad adolescente se construye desde
parámetros como los de confrontación generacional, crecimiento y júbilo ante la posibilidad
de ejercer autonomía. Por el contrario el neoliberalismo genera una “retracción” de
espacios sociales, destitución del porvenir y predominio de sensaciones de inestabilidad
e inseguridad que facilita la instauración de un modelo familiar  que denomino “estructura
de padres agobiados”. La subjetividad adolescente aparece incapaz de ejercer
confrontación generacional, predominando el deseo de “proteger” a la familia (“mesianismo
exacerbado”) a través de una fantasmática que actúa como “escena de  enhebramiento”
capaz de anular la búsqueda de autonomía y crecimiento.
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This study seeks to make a contribution to the subject
of the relationship between Subjectivity, Culture and Society,
trying to see how adolescents’ subjectivity and families are
negotiated within the modern, Keynesian, welfare state, and
how changes implicated in neoliberalism are verified in self-
expression and self-development. For both situations, certain
elements will be analyzed that influence how an adolescent
identifies and expresses him or herself during the
construction of subjectivity. 
The hypothesis I am working from is that social context,
the construction of subjectivity and relationships are largely
interrelated and inevitably exercise a mutual influence over
each other. Along those lines, I am currently investigating
what bearing these social phenomena have on how we relate
to one another. This implies that there is no single,
generalized, unchanging subjectivity. There are subjectivities
and processes of subjectification, which makes research
dealing with those aspects imperative.
It would be impossible to go into depth on every topic
implicated in social and economic neoliberalism due to space
limitations. I will simply say that certain characteristics of
neoliberalism, such as rising rates of structural
unemployment, reduced salaries, an extremely flexible work
day, alarming rates of drop-out among students, and
radicalized processes of social exclusion, cannot help but
affect the family and its members.
It is a situation in which the community denies its
foundation (Puget & Kaës, 1991), provoking generalized
violence both among and against its subjects. In this way,
the narcissist contract (Aulagnier, 1975) is resented for
affecting continuity, permanence and change. 
Everyday life has become a matter of “survival,” with
slim to no opportunities in education and work. This
coincides with an exhausted capacity for tolerance between
family members, which I call in the present study the
“structure of overwhelmed parents.” The ability for young
people to grow becomes fragile and the question becomes:
to consume or not to consume, survival or extinction,
eliminating the ability to protect “well enough.” This study
seeks to explain some of these urgent and stressful questions.
It is important to note that due to this paper’s essay style,
the clinical material is included exclusively for reference,
not intending to act as empirical support. I am writing a
thorough analysis of clinical material collected from
adolescents in another publication (Klein, 2006).
Keynesian Modernity: The Family, Parenting and
Protection
Giddens observes that the daily experience of security
and safety is reduced to “certain experiences characteristic
of infancy” (Giddens, 1991/1997, p. 92), related to the
feeling of “basic trust”: “trust not only implies that one has
learned to trust in equity, equality and the continuity of
external agents, but that one can trust in one’s own self”
(idem, p. 94). 
This trust relates to the experience of protective parents,
capable of caring for and protecting their children. This
extends into the child’s social development. If a child learns
to trust in his or her parents, it is because they also trust
their environment and vice versa. There is a continuous
structure, then, between the family, social, and subjective
spheres- intimately related to one another – that establishes
signs of trust and experiences of safety and reassurance.
This special union is a success and an expression of
modernity, one of whose greatest manifestations is achieving
“basic trust.” Giddens (1991/1997) explicitly relates this
process to the quality and the type of care that provides the
individual needs of the child. This care simultaneously
expresses certain values and cultural codes to be reproduced
and valued by the child.
One condition of basic trust is that there be a sense of
integration between one’s parents and the social sphere, or
in other words, between the parents and the adulthood they
possess. The transmission of certain models of fatherhood
and motherhood solidly and firmly reflect what it is to be
an adult within a Keynesian society. Parents who teach
“basic trust” are proud to be parents.
It is necessary, then, to keep in mind the social structures
that dignify parents as adults in order to enable that feeling.
Teaching children this way, in effect, transmits society
through activities during which adults identify and dignify
themselves. To be an adult, to educate, and to be integrated
into society, is a self-fulfilling triad: 
Part of the humanization of a father is his transition to
emotional reality on his own terms, the movement from a work-
related space into home life (…). The relationship between the
family and the father–other, and the nature of his transformation
into a young father, are of considerable psychic importance to
the growing child. To a certain extent, it is an essential job
that helps build the relationship of the child with reality (Bollas,
1991, p. 207).
The home-work dynamic, a precise education and the
increased security that society expects of adults, just as
adults provide during their children’s infancy, are all
transmitted to the dimension of pride: 
He (the father) adapts to the law of the passage of time,
which distances and separates family members from the home
sphere. Fathers who accept this transition are transported to
another place, to the world of work and obligations (…) The
return of the father from work is therefore a complex,
intrapsychic moment for the child awaiting him, for the wife
who perhaps needs to process the transition, too, and for the
man himself (…) Inevitably, every child comes to realize that
there exists a world that makes their history, and that runs on
its own time, beyond the walls of the home (Bollas, 1991, p.
218).
That is to say, children are not only raised on narcissism,
but also believing that some of what they are given will
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serve them in their lives and in their futures. The family
becomes a component of the narcissist contract, capable of
anticipating and cathecting a possible future, and giving it
a sense of cohesiveness and unity. 
Giddens (1991/1997) explains the importance of primary
unity, arguing that not dividing family members is not in
and of itself Oedipal, but rather a model for psychosomatic
and social integration. In any case, it is not an Oedipus
scenario in the sense of rivalry, but rather in terms of
intergenerational cooperation (Kohut, 1982).   
From this perspective, what prevail in the family
relationship are real, not fantasized, experiences, through
which the child is empowered by what the father teaches
him or her, and acts as a version of an expert system. At
the same time, the absence of the parents is not experienced
as a catastrophe because the feeling of basic trust always
creates “space” between child and parents. 
This potential space: “refers to the ability of the child
to tolerate distance from their caregiver” (Giddens,
1991/1997, p. 95). “Potential” as a subjective and relationship
operating system, complicates the nuclear family and comes
as a consequence of the fact that, in modernity, the notion
that distance from one’s parents does not imply their
extinction must be subjectively negotiated. This is produced
by certain fractures that Giddens does not identify. One such
fracture is that children are educated socially (at school) as
well as by the family and another is that of the home sphere
from the space of productivity and work. 
In the Middle Ages (Ariès & Duby, 1990a), the home
sphere was also a space of economic productivity and
education, a point of disassociation and contrast from
modernity. Thus, in the construction of subjectivity, the
potential or transitional space (Winnicott, 1979) seeks
resolution of the father’s absence as his potential to return.
At the same time, a crucial homology occurs between the
home –a closed space – and subjectivity – another closed
space. Coming and going, leaving and entering, and
receiving and transforming all complicate the psyche, while
making sense of family dynamics. It is not in vain that
Winnicott (1972) suggests one’s ability to be alone as an
index of mental health, in that it reveals a nucleus of
psychological development of trust, one centered in the trust
that the caregiver will return.
The nuclear family, then, is more than a simple division
of roles between father, mother and children. It implies the
specific operation of different spaces and times, reflecting
many, specific types of subjectivity. The care giving “expert”
is not only the person who cares for the child, but also the
one who guarantees the necessary conditions of that child’s
survival. This demonstrates that between home, society and
subjectivity there is not only integration but also a maintained
expectation (prediction) of the caregiver’s return at times
when integration is absent (Giddens, 1991/1997). 
This feeling of expectation is fundamental and
indispensable to basic trust. I certainly believe that it
demonstrates a consolidation of an unnecessary mental zone
that reaches psychic representation in the form of something
integrated into thought (Bollas, 1991). 
Winnicott explains: “Good care produces a state of things
in which integration becomes a fact and a person is said to
exist” (Winnicott, 1979, p. 141). In other words, “sufficiently
good” parental care is that which, in the first place, avoids
the appearance of that which generally remains disperse,
defending solid structures in exchange: the true self, the feeling
of security, a state of integration and a state of continuity.   
This zone of the mind is associated with the ability to
imagine, or reflexive functioning, which denotes an
understanding of one’s own behavior and that of others in
terms of mental states (Fonagy, 1999, 2000). Healthy
attachment reflects the ability of parents to observe their
children’s mentality and facilitate in them a general
understanding of mentality. I suggest, then, that we revise
the notion of “basic trust” to consider it to involve the
processes Green calls tertiary (Green, 1994). This would
theorize the capacity to incorporate processes of attachment
and detachment, and bring repressed feelings into
consciousness, as integral to the psyche 
Parents use reflexive functioning to transmit two pieces
of information. First, that matters may be thought through
and resolved, and second, that that process can be carried
out in the child’s mind. This places confidence in the child,
while simultaneously transferring the harmony of a stable
social context, indispensable in order for things to acquire
a sense of rationality. This way, parents create the precedence
for a value system for children to apply to thinking: “No
thought is possible without the precedence of other thinkers,
and the collective formations that came before the subject”
(Kaës, 1994, p. 71). 
In this way, one hopes that the child gradually takes on
responsibilities, learning to respond to their environment
with unsettled feelings or worries (Winnicott, 1979). I
consider unsettling feelings an opportunity to explore new
things, and it certainly involves what is called a
“transformational scene” operating from the psyche and
capable of sacrificing for change (Klein, 2003, 2004). The
ability known as “worrying” can also begin in the reverse
order; as Brandt, Giovacchini, and Lobel (1989) argue, if
the mother is capable of worrying about her baby, she will
consider her child an “other” and will tolerate his or her
personal, transitional processes1.   
We may think that adequate care giving techniques
definitely involve abilities that allow one to achieve
1 In other words: this opposes endogamous fusion. 
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autonomy, security in oneself, the ability to be alone, in
other words, psychic traits that allow for the development
of the process of citizenship with its implicit interplay of
rights – obligations, limits and freedoms. In the case of
citizenship, the theme of interlocutor – neighbor- is integral
to its development. Similarly, in the origins of thinking, I
propose the theme of similarity - fraternity as being of utmost
importance (Kaës, 1994).
For this reason, a child should be able to use an object
with “cruelty” (Winnicott, 1979), or rather, use it excessively,
while at once maintaining a calm, tranquil relationship of
mother –environment-. Lyons-Ruth (2004) proposes that the
emotional unavailability of parents generates emotional
vulnerability. In contrast, their emotional availability is
related to the mother being prepared to be a mother, and to
be used as such without restriction, while at the same time
being recognized socially as a mother – adult without
restriction and without being discredited as such. 
Still, there remains another possible point of overlap
between social and family organization. This refers to the
prohibition of incest and patricide. This “great prohibition”
(Kaës, 1993, p. 345) assures the survival of future
generations and a sense of propagation and introduces the
idea of transmission, of descendents and of the law as an
essential regulator. 
Thus, a common, shared, social ideal is configured: the
passage of the original family to the destined family of the
future. In terms of subjectivity, this involves elucidating
ambivalence to create a base for emotional structure. 
The classical father appears to be a regulator of desires
and is a designated, “assigned” representative of the law
(Aulagnier, 1975), expressing an isomorphism between
symbolic laws and social norms: “as the capacity to connect
(…) we desire an association with others that allows human
spaces to exists” (Kaës, 1994, p. 193). 
Along those lines, the Oedipus complex organizes and
delineates the differences between sexes and generations,
as well as temporal and subjective differences: the mother
has to do with origins, narcissism, and the past, while the
father is associated with objectivity, the future and successive
generations (Aulagnier, 1975)2.  The mother should – in
this imaginary world – guarantee the origin and foundation
of the future father and his exogamous success. Achieving
the threat of castration implies a departure from the
immortality of primary narcissism, and accepting the
mortality implicit in secondary narcissism, as a means of
recognizing oneself in the cycle of generations. When these
conditions are present, access is granted to social recognition
and to shared ideals. 
Thus, in the Oedipus scenario, the reflexive structure
and the ability to interact fuse when: 
It is accepted that not only does the other desire him or
her [the child], but also a third party; they are desired even
when they are not the only one; they are desired for one thing
and the third for another thing (…) the passage from a logic
of exclusion to a conjunction –me and the third- it is not merely
a question of guaranteed evolution over time…in the context
of intersubjectivity in which the subject develops, messages
from the meaningful other, the experiences of waiting,
preferences and themes all leave their mark on this sensibility
(Bleichmar, 1981, p. 11).
A process originates from there (Kaës, 1993) that defines
the psyche and involves social renovation through ideals that
pertain to a particular group and, at once, an emblem of
belonging to that group. If the stress that surrounds primary
narcissism is the stress of vulnerability (Bernard, 1991),
surrounding the ideal is the stress of assignment. The subject,
then, chooses certain values (through their Ideal Self), and
assigns them to him or herself in order to feel like part of a
group: “through this process, the subject is assured continuity,
unity, and self-value” (Kaës, 1993, p. 349). 
Through the Ideal Self, the subject demands to be
considered a representative of the group, in a contract that
assigns pre-established, preserved places with new meanings
in order to enter into a symbolic discussion. 
The Oedipus complex, then, both prohibits and liberates
(Laplanche, 1980), restricts and enables and labels while
structuring, in that it re-opens the cycle of exchanges that
tie a family to the social sphere and vice versa. In this way,
it ensures continuity between families, but a discontinuity
within the family unit itself. Thus, the law of castration
seems to be a “liberating phenomenon” (Laplanche, 1980,
p. 155).3
Nevertheless, in order for the threat of castration – the
Oedipus axis – to have an effect, there must be a strong
father, a father capable of carrying out that threat. Like the
confrontation discussed by Winnicott (1972), the Oedipus
complex requires differentiated, separate places for adults
and for children, or better said, adults must want to be adults
and not kids. This rests on a set structure of generational
and familial roles. 
The civilized option presented by modernity is to
renounce the mother, or put her beneath the zone of what
is prohibited and move on to another feminine object. This
requires one to renounce what is maternal to access that
which is feminine. However, that situation could also be
read in terms of spatial and temporal coordinates, which try
to “break” the maternal space in order to enter the temporal
2 I am aware of the gender prejudices involved in Aulagnier’s way of presenting the matter.
3 In a sense, I ask myself what a child might understand of the Oedipus complex. I do not believe that it is the order of understanding
that comes into play here. Bollas (1991) puts it excellently in saying that the Oedipus complex is “known, not thought.” 
– biographical, paternal dimension. This rupture and closure
of a space is one possible way to characterize the prohibition
of incest, which “opens” the temporal dimension of
subjectivity.
On the contrary, given the fact that the temporal
dimension of subjectivity is ridden with “obstacles,” what
prevails is pathology from before, from the past, and the
mother is a space that always reproduces itself in opposition
to the future and to survival. This situation, intolerable to
modernity, receives from subjectivity the name of
compulsion to repeat, while survival is denominated by
“limits,” “barriers” and “acceptance of desire.”
In that case, the Oedipal scenario is not the same as
family, but is rather a figure of mediation between the family
and social spheres. It assures and consolidates, as apparently
the incest situation does, the feeling that the family is in
maximally saturated danger (which appears in the
imagination as a kind of self-intoxication), so it becomes
imperative that one begin another family. Following this
logic, there is a social intervention that tries to control
familial excess perceived as a danger to modernity.  (Ariès
& Duby, 1990b). 
Oedipus’s end was not in vain – latency, the beginning
of school – has to do with the institutionalization of the
child. At the mental level, that verifies that there is something
beyond the family: the social sphere. The fact that the social
sphere appears simultaneously with classmates – fraternity
- and with teachers – verticality – obviously has subjective
consequences.   
The child understands, then, that his or her family is no
longer the absolute body that he or she demanded, that there
are other bodies and other spaces. Thus, it is no longer
sufficient to signal that the passage from what is maternal
to femininity is the closure of the spatial – familial sphere
in order to continue on to temporality.  It must be added
that this closure enables passage to a spatial-temporal
institution. 
In certain ways, the Oedipus complex implicates the
parents, but it also involves their disappearance. It is driven
by the parents (Laplanche, 1980) yet it guarantees their
deactivation as significant figures, in order to implement
social values (Aulagnier, 1975). They disappear but resurge
in fantasy at the level of exchanges with the future child –
adult with other adults – probable – promised. This sense
of the future enhances their interaction.
To a certain point, the parents are “sacrificed” to the
Oedipus scenario, convinced by and identified with social
values that require a guarantee of survival and the promise
of a future. The opposite scenario, wherein the family
exhibits dominance over the Oedipus complex, would imply
that the feeling of nostalgia and insecurity prevail over
security and basic trust.
The threat of castration is, to Freud (1924) “do not sleep
with your mother,” to Lacan (1979) “do not reintegrate your
product” and to Berenstein (1981), according to the theory
of relationship ties, “do not regress to the person who was
your giver.” The two first sayings are insufficient because
they do not realize fully the laws governing modernity,
which does not only include prohibition but also regulation
and enabling. The law as a form of exchange and regulation
is most similar to Lacan’s  point of view, which states that
there be “no reintegration” toward the mother, indicating
that there is no way the child could complete her and
meanwhile, at some point, the mother no longer desires or
values the phallus, which guarantees her child progress
toward the genital object.
The child comes to have his own identity, protected in
the social sphere, manifested as the law of the symbolic
father. The law (social and of modernity), then, shifts away
from the family and is replaced by society. The family ends
up stripped of power: “the mother loses her identification
with the law, with being someone who dictates, the law as
an entity that extends beyond character remains in place,
so it may be said that the symbolic father is the format of
the law” (Bleichmar, 1982, p. 79).
However, if there is at some moment a symbolic father,
it is because he is not a simple “representative,” but also
“delegate” and “counter signer” with clear powers that
occupy the respectable position of “adulthood.”
Psychoanalysis sometimes forgets that an adult is not an
immutable, unchangeable figure. The moment the mother
and father express that: “there is a law external to us” is
the moment coinciding with the understanding that: “we are
adults and as such, we know that the law is always external.”
It is a structural action that relates positions and places,
that implies interaction for the adult, for which there is
libidinal and social pleasure in being an adult, which enables
one to “renounce” the child as an omnipotent object. The
emblems of the paternal figure must be provided and
“recognized by the social sphere, so that they are authorized
to proclaim themselves integral parts of the social ideal. The
parents, both at the beginning and end of the Oedipus
complex, maintain – we hope they maintain – intact their
plain condition as worthy members of society. 
In modernity, the father and mother create a spatial
distribution of what is inside and what is outside. The
“outside” is the father’s work, and the necessary force that
work implies, but also danger and the unforeseen. “Inside”
is the home, the place of the residence, dreams and
protection. The mother remains in the house and it is
certainly recognizable that: 
The father lives or seems to live by a different order of
time, such that we could call it paternal time to distinguish it
from maternal time. Maternal time: 1) atemporal 2) instinctual
3) eternal 4) intimate. Paternal time: 1) stormy 2) social 3)
mortal 4) impersonal (Bollas, 1993, p. 216).
By definition: it is the division between a space of refuge,
protection and care, from a place of obligations and “storms.”
The father specializes, then, in the temporal, and the mother
in the spatial. The mother mitigates inside and outside spaces,
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while the father controls time, coming and going, leaving
and returning. Together, they unite for a sense of stability,
progress and comfort. Patience in the transition that sends
the father away to later return assumes that adults are proud
to be adults. The father is supported in his leaving and
returning because he is a worker, a quality guaranteed in
adulthood.
Nevertheless, both parents are representatives of the
social world. The law – traditionally ascribed to the father
– does not represent the entire social world, but rather a part
of its interrelated web of exchanges. The social sphere,
regarding motherhood, is also what Giddens (1991/1997)
formulates in terms of “basic trust.”
Problematic spatial and temporal discontinuities begin
with what is at the subjective level a transitional space, in
that it alternates and negotiates between presences and
absences. Although the father is absent, he will always return,
which expresses a “promise” structure. To clarify, if someone
presents him or herself as secure in their adulthood, they
stop showing their vulnerability, but not for that reason
alone. This is what differentiates a real father from the Father
of the Horde (Klein, 2004).
The father in the social sphere seems like another space
to the child, apart and mysterious (Bollas, 1993). It is a
space that could devour the father and never return him. It
is a wonder that I do not ascribe to the theory of the
“consummated marriage” between fatherhood and the social
sphere. Among them there are “battles” that are not, however,
pathological. On the contrary, I believe that they reveal
certain “fracture” points in the mediation of these figures
that should in theory absolutely always reformulate
themselves constantly to guarantee passage from one,
threatening, transitory and incomprehensible space to a
temporal reorganization that ensures a homeostasis between
the social, familial and subjective spheres.
Neoliberalism: The Deprived Family and the
Challenges of Parenthood
Laura Tavares explains that neoliberalism is not limited
to: “economic measures of interactive and transitory effects
[on the contrary, they bear] social consequences that are
serious, permanent, and many times a difficult step
backward” (Tavares, 1999, p. 171). This section will develop
only one of these consequences: the passage of the nuclear
family in Keynesian modernity to what I call a family
deprived by neoliberalism. However, it is necessary to
mention that transformations within the family form only a
part of a wider problem, and one that preceded neoliberalism.
The demographic transition away from individualization
transformed the relationships involved in production and
also included changes in the construction of gender such
that women participate more and more in the labor market.
Consider the existing quantity of sex changes, new
reproductive technologies, and the significant increase in
the rate of pregnancy among young and adolescent women;
these factors are all relevant (Vasconcelos & Morgano, 2005).
As I have already begun to develop, it is relevant to bear
in mind the role of certain, essential elements of the family
in the Keynesian model: home, work, the ability to protect,
hospitality and reassurance in the construction of subjectivity.
The generous, maternal body and the paternal word of law
and order were built into a stable model, an excellent
homeostasis, like a “nest” that one can always return to in
dreams and memories.
Remember that Araujo (2002) said the “gods” of
modernity resided primarily in the work sector, savings,
order and physical health and hygiene. It was important to
try to be “useful” to society and to “oneself.” These elements
that maintained balance are now destroyed by neoliberalism: 
It has been confirmed, then, that the principal parameters
ensuring this fragile harmony have slid (…) Work (…) is more
than work, so non-work is more than unemployment, which
says a lot (…) This relates to a complete mutation of our
relationship with work and as a consequence, our relationship
with the world: We would need to invent a totally new way to
inhabit this world, or resign ourselves to the Apocalypse (…)
The true problem is not just the looming “precarious periphery,”
but also the “destabilization” of stability (…) In this dynamic,
nothing is “marginal.” Just as pauperism in the 19th century
was carved into the industrial age, precarious employment is
a central process, governed by the new technological-economic
demands of modern capitalism and its evolution (Castel, 1997,
pp. 390-413).
This situation implies a general restructuring of identity
and relationships and thus, too, an acute restructuring of
the family that reveals the “impact” of social reinsertion.
This manifests itself within the family in the disarticulation
and confusion of roles, disenchantment with the social
sphere, isolation and constant feelings of threat and fear of
losing one’s job (Araujo, 2002). Humiliation becomes an
undeniable fact just like one condition it correlates with:
the need to submit (Forrester, 2000). On the central axis of
neoliberalism it is what I call: “the feeling of imminent
catastrophe” (Klein, 2006). 
The family system, then, receives excessive, destabilizing
emotions such as shame, depression, and disrespect toward
the elderly, as well as upset and blame toward children:
There is a debt, in a sense, paid upward, but it is
fundamentally paid downward. This debt incurred by parents
is paid by their children. The debt is authoritative, pressing
and interminable. It is one debt that cannot be avoided. When
external circumstances keep us from paying it off – and we are
dishonored for not honoring our obligations – (…) it carries
with it an intolerable humiliation (…) For the first time, an
entire generation is impeded from paying the debt it incurred
(…) The default, a breakdown that prevents the external debt
from being paid, not only alludes to the economic disaster that
blames us for a commitment made in our name, by whom no
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one knows, but that generates a deep psychical conflict acting
as a prohibition so that we may assure our children that they
will have the same things our own parents gave us (Volnovich,
2002, pp. 1-2).
This way, we may assume that parents’ possibility of
maintaining a dignified, honorable image of themselves has
been annihilated. Deprived themselves, as adults, it is
impossible for them to care for their children, they lose the
pride associated with emotionally sustaining a child – which
is less important – they suffer the “impact” and perplexity
of all of this, and children do not know “how” to be proud
of their parent.
This is a disgraceful situation in which the children are
now the ones who come to care for their parents. This
involves sensitive psychical material, where (Janin, 1989)
children become repositories for their parents’ worries, placing
them in the role of caregiver. They try to keep their parents
from falling into states of depression or excess. They do not
take care of themselves, which nourishes a politic of self-
punishment and self-sacrifice, so the child starts to function
as an object of primary narcissism (Berenstein & Puget,
1988), losing the regulation of self-esteem, the ability to
manage stress and the vitality of desire (Berman et al., 1994). 
The construction of subjectivity, then, comes from a
place of disorganized attachment (Fonagy, 2000), which
does not necessarily relate to physical, but rather
psychological abuse.  The father-caregiver can never forget
“social reality,” which allowed the child to grow steadily
without worrying about it. On the contrary, the “upset”
parents are not protectors, nor are they allowed to continue
representing society. In light of that point, instead of being
responsible for their own growth, the child becomes
responsible for the “downfall” of their parents.
In this way, the child prematurely develops a social
structure in his or her mind, which implies some incentive
for their role as messiah child which, instead of “nurturing”
their own psychic growth, nurtures that of their parents. The
child inevitably perceives their parents as abused,
transforming the child into an “expert” on the parents’
emotional needs and moods (Klein, 2006).
The construction of subjectivity is carried out amid
nervous expectation, prevalent insecurity and difficulty
forming a cohesive self apart from the parents’ identities.
Since the parents do not succeed in finding a recognizable
version of their selves in the social sphere, the child does
not either. Thus, the border of the psychic apparatus
responsible for processes of discrimination and differentiation
becomes pathological. (Kaës, 1993).
The emphasis on care makes it difficult for the
ambivalence that generates mental health to form, because
hate is experienced as terrifying and as carrying blame,
which is characteristic of the schizo-paranoiac stage of
massive projection during identification (Baranger, 1971).
The social abuse of parents incapacitates them, making it
impossible to sustain the illusion of a self-generated, psychic
apparatus in their children. The parents worry about the
family, using (whenever possible) desperate survival
practices.
It is important to clarify that, although the social sphere
is always present, it is not always the same as what is
“revealed” through family mediation, during which it is
imposed as a force that invades and empties the family
system. Instead of being a silent area, it becomes a “scream”
that brings on a break down of the intersubjective capacity
of the psychic apparatus, imposing violent and trans-
subjective phenomena (Kaës, 1993). I often ask myself if
this situation is comparable to the phenomenon known as
psychophobia (Valdré, 1998) that is found in adolescents,
and quite serious, wherein the very activity of thinking is
feared and avoided.
Based on Winnicott’s work (1981), we can acknowledge
the importance of being able to depend on adequate means
of sustenance and of maintaining a predictable and
sufficiently good environment that establishes feelings of
control and recognition. Thus, within the modern, Keynesian
matrix, parents might fear the exogamous “outcome” for
their child, but not in greater measure than the family’s pride
and hope for a descendent who will obtain autonomy and
decision-making capacity. The downside, on the other hand,
is living with the loom of imminent catastrophe, which
definitely implies a passage from one’s roles as a parent,
caregiver and protector, to a vulnerable parental status.
In that way, the processes of dialog and affective
exchange, symbolic and interactive, (Lyons-Ruth, 2004) are
substituted for ambiguous messages, double messages or
unspeakable secrets that cannot be confessed. This
accentuates the processes of endogamy and the closing-in
of the, not so much due to a lack of paternal functioning as
to an increasing defense system of family protection in the
face of generalized vulnerability.  
What I refer to as the politic of trial and error, the
adolescent’s important ability to explore new and
spontaneous (Klein, 2003) experiences, is in danger of
extinction. It is being substituted by a politic of disaccord,
which is related to an unexpected and incomprehensible
situation that “tears away at” the stable foundation of the
middle class, and society in general.
If the father of the clan can confirm that (Freud, 1913):
I am the law because I have the power, I am indisputable,”
then the opposite father figure may be construed as weak and
in a state of ruin. He would not be a strong father, he would
not be believed to be strong, nor would he be seen as strong.
Roudinesco indicates how the father, “due to his economic
impotence, no longer brings fear” (Roudinesco, 2003, p. 154).
If sometimes, in the world of clowns and circus life, an ogre-
father appears, this is because in the world of reality, the
father figure is lost in a state of confusion.
He can be neither the terrible father from the second
stage of the Oedipus complex (Lacan, 1979), nor the father
who represents the law – the paternal function – in the name
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of society, which in reality he devalues. According to Joel
Birman’s (2001) analysis, the paternal function is articulated
decisively in the social sphere:
And on this specific point, I would like to focus my criticism
of Lacan’s literature about the law: that it could escape certain
consequences that are inevitable in an interpretation of justice
(…) In Brazil, the law is truly a dead language, completely
dissociated from the social practices of justice. The symbolic
conceptualization of the law cannot restrict it simply to
linguistic processes; it should definitely be re-launched in social
and political camps in which the political economy, where
goods and values are exchanged in the social sphere, attacks
the psychic economy of the impulses, desires and demands of
social agents (…) I believe that the functioning of Brazilian
society allows us to concretely perceive, and from a privileged
standpoint, the interval between the symbolic register of the
law and the normative functioning of justice (Birman, 2001,
pp. 280-281). 
I, any case, should clarify that this change in the paternal
function is inseparable from the dissolving structure of the
nuclear family, tied to a long process that extends far beyond
neoliberalism. In this sense, a progressive “socialization”
of several aspects of family is apparent, and social
institutions (school, religion, etc.) assume parts of the
maternal and paternal roles. Therefore, social structures
create a change in the family that must be considered in
depth:
The family resembles an unusual tribe, an asexual, fraternal
web without hierarchy or authority in which each person feels
autonomous or as though they serve a function (...) Thus,
paternal domination can only exercise itself in cases of
consented co-participation that respects the position of each
member connected by the institution of marriage (…) Injured
in both body and spirit, the mutilated patriarch of the new,
symbolic order can no longer claim to be of value as more
than the don of his family name to claim his right to a sort of
“adopted” nomination (…) In the following, the father shares
power over the child with the mother, and his old prerogatives,
debilitated by the decades, are reduced to practically nothing.
The family is converted, then, into “coparental” form and we
begin to hear about “coparenting” (Roudinesco, 2003, pp.
168-111).
The shifting roles Roudinesco describes may be better
described in light of certain changes that are produced more
and more pronouncedly. Along those lines, it might be better
to indicate that it is not that “there is no longer a need for
a father” but rather that aspects of the paternal role have
become impossible or have been extinguished:
Unemployment as a mark of identity instead of as a
temporary state, as well as feelings of shame, tell us about
new, erroneous conditions of authority (…) they deprive fathers
of value and, consequently, of authority. Contemporary men
and women are no longer able to recognize a command,
neither to reject it nor to obey it (Duschatzky & Corea, 2002,
pp. 61-79).
Because of this, the family unit has endured substantial
changes:
The child’s subjectivity (…) has no point of reference in
adult figures  in the family or at school; on the contrary, adult
figures are referred to with aggression, injury and sometimes
in expressions oscillating between complaint and the protest
that no one listens to them (…) The father figure is practically
absent and the mother is insinuated as impotent and suffering
(…) The family is no longer a place to transmit the law through
a paternal figure; work is no longer an area that reinforces
the role of the father as the provider for the family; and the
mandate on education, rooted in the belief that to study
guaranteed a better future, has been destroyed (Duschatzky
&Corea, 2002, p. 63).
The fact that the weak father is insufficient for the
operation of a symbolic system (Dofour, 2005) is imposed
by Keynes’s style of modernity, which implies an
abandonment of the subject to luck and a relocation of
temporal linearity, “and with it, a rupture of inter-generational
ties, in other words, a rupture between the past and the
present” (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 25).
When a father no longer knows what it means to be a
father, there is a break-down in temporality, and discontinuity
comes to dominate over continuity. Equivalently, when the
mother no longer occupies her role as intermediary between
the inside space of the home and the outside, social space,
it is difficult to establish a transitional space. This coincides
with a predominant feeling of emptiness. 
For adolescents especially, this makes access to
generational confrontation impossible (Winnicott, 1972),
which requires adults that are recognizable as such, who
sustain their power and decision-making agency. This
situation shows that a social base no longer exists from
which an adult may neither project him or herself, nor
sustain and propagate him or herself as a parent. The
structures that mediate the transformation of mental
representations in the psychic system of the child are lost
(Klein, 2003, 2006).   
In their place are ties of negligence and doubt (Kancyper,
1997). Structural conditions that are crucial to the
construction of subjectivity are being lost: 
The real presence of a father –or another individual able
to create real presence – is paramount for the “operation of
a symbolic system” that fosters ethics and subjectivity, which
are necessary for the subject’s social life (Gryner, 2003, p.
136).
Thus, the modern family is considered to “emerge
from the beginnings of a social change” (Wainerman,
1996, p. 212) wherein family is no longer, and cannot
be, an intermediary figure between its members and
society: “family is not only defined as an essential societal
force (…) it is apparently necessary for any sort of
subjective rebellion: children against parents, citizens
against the State, individuals against the masses”
(Roudinesco, 2003, p. 97).
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The way an adolescent confronts his or her family dilutes
and directs their aggression, which allows for growth
(Winnicott, 1972), but acts as an antagonist4 toward the
family, with subjectivity that is, as it unfolds, complicated
by rebellion and confrontation (Klein, 2002, 2003, 2004).
The fact that this dimension cannot sustain itself anymore
gives an incentive to heteroclite5 subjectivity for which
uncontrolled, irregular, ominous life events prevail in
subjectivity, a result of the “shattering” of a doubly
protective environment: the sustained family and the psychic
border’s guarantee that one “takes care of him or herself”
(Klein, 2006) .
A Father In Search of Fatherhood
This study seeks to find out how certain social situations
cannot help but interfere in subjectivity and family ties.
Keynesian modernity proposed a socioeconomic matrix that
was relatively stable, with the premise of probable survival
and the declaration of an achievable promise. It tried to
frame it within a predictable economic context with social
stability. Furthermore, it suggested a sort of social
homeostasis belonging to the rule of constancy (Laplanche
& Pontalis, 1981) that posits psychic functioning as both a
social regulator and a familial organizer. 
On the other hand, neoliberalism – as a social, economic
and political model – generates a “disintegration” of life’s
spaces, social identity and the joy of social participation.
When there is simultaneously a “rupture” of the social fabric
and the principle of constancy is broken, plausible systems
of explanation turn out to be partial and insufficient.
Therefore, it is critical that we reconsider the theories
surrounding, as well as the devices used to construct
subjectivity and new relationships. 
One of these factors has to do with fatherhood. Keep in
mind that the father provides the signs of certainty needed
to carry out life projects and trophic growth processes.
However, the father that young people transmit (Klein, 2006)
seems to increasingly resemble an untouchable entity that
cannot be found: an enigma.  It is no longer a fixed value,
a kind of certainty. On the contrary, the message transmitted
is that we no longer know who the father is, what a father
is or what makes a father.
He remains in a distant place, perhaps expelled by his
own children, or maybe he sent himself away. This weak,
absent, unrecognizable father is not able to receive hate
from his children (and I mean hate in the Winnicottian sense
(Winnicott, 1972) of aggression in the service of growth),
nor can he receive their love. In this case, there is something
ambivalent that goes unarticulated and fragmented, which
explains why extreme attitudes of resentment and/or guilt
are emphasized.  
As terribly as this matter could end up, the Freudian
Father of the Clan (Freud, 1913) is here, he is present and
he directs, orders and guides. On the other hand, this version
of the father does not give orders, nor does he have a voice.
He is a father that exists only in the pages of a phonebook.
He knows nothing about the law. Instead of aligning himself
with his children, he disowns or is indifferent toward them. 
Nevertheless, I do believe that there is a symbolic
dimension of the father that cannot be denied. Much of it
is found, as I already mentioned, in the several institutions
that comprise the socialization of fatherhood. However, I
find that for many adolescents (Klein, 2006), seeking
fatherhood turns into a compulsion that establishes a search
as dramatic as it is fruitless, and that reveals how, in this
dilemma, something integral to growth is put at stake. The
compulsivity, contrary to what would be expected, is not at
the service of sickness, but rather that of health.
In a sense, the neoliberal context establishes a
disassociation between the familial and the parental. The
expected movement toward identity consolidation and social
reassurance belonging to the nuclear family seem to have
undergone radical changes in order to maintain the
endogamy factor – exogamy, the simple passage of the
original family to the future family, stops making sense
(Klein, 2006). 
It interests me to locate kids’ so-called “familiar novel”
in this way. According to Freud (Laplanche & Pontalis,
1981), it is understood as a fantasy by which current parents
are substituted by others, which indulges in marvelous,
narcissistic attributes. On the contrary, the aforementioned
familiar novel does not seek to modify those attributes, but
to make them adopt certain points left out of the Freudian
version whose absence leads to suffering. It is no longer a
matter of whether the father is adoptive or not. On the
contrary, they un-adopt their kids, instead having nothing
to do with them, which begs a question of alignment where
it ought not to be. 
I believe, then, that the question of alignment, of
succession and inheritance – not present in the Freudian,
familiar novel – is perhaps resolved through a fraternal
novel. I cannot go into depth on this theme but perhaps
these kids feel in a way more “adopted,” cared for and
cleaned up after by their siblings more than by their
biological parents. In any case, this marks a fundamental
difference in the configuration of the family system.
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I will elaborate upon what has already been said: to
continue to maintain the Oedipus complex as a structural
reference, in its conventional conception, is oversimplifying
because of the need to include the fraternal complex
(Kancyper, 1997) as a fundamental dimension of subjectivity.
In that sense, the incest-castration pair, which continues to
be a valid descriptor, should be complimented by aligned
versus unaligned pairs.  
The fraternal novel is inseparable from fatherhood and
its doubles. The father is no longer guaranteed fatherhood,
which has come to include other figures: uncle, grandfather,
stepfather, brother and professor, with guaranteed structural
recognition in all cases. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that,
meanwhile, fraternity also implicates a system of rivalry
and violence between two opposing groups: excluded and
included, preferred and relegated, sign and insignificant
(Lewkowicz, 2004).
The Structure of Upset Parents
It is worth considering, then, whether the father-mother
pair (in the regressive-prospective sense) has not been
substituted by others, like the brother-grandmother pair, in
a search for dialog they are incapable of sustaining, It is
imbued as if in a “suffocating” environment where
neoliberalism’s divestment creates what I call the structure
of upset parents (Klein, 2006).
These parents are too busy managing social survival
to simultaneously maintain family communication and
dialog, so it becomes impossible to sustain a libidinal
space for the children, and they are chronically excluded
from an encounter that would have otherwise strengthened
them. 
I understand that an error that is repeatedly made is that
parents do not carry out a generational confrontation with
their children, since the parents disguise themselves as
“adolescents.” This point of view has its faults, in my
opinion. Adults do not want to be adolescents; they want
to be young, which is not the same thing at all. If they avoid
confrontation with their children, it is because they feel
incapable of managing that situation because elements of
emotional upset (structure of upset parents) nullify essential
qualities like strength and security.
Having rejected the confrontation possibility (Winnicott,
1972), an adolescent’s world is solidified and sealed, guards
secrets and feared scenes, and fuses relationship ties.  The
remaining option, then, is not to separate, to assemble a
single family skin, taking mutual care of each other, building
a scene where change “freezes,” to exacerbate the threading
scene (Klein, 2006). That is capable of nullifying all growth,
which is inevitably experienced as incomprehensible and
horrific. Nothing will ever be the same, subjectively and in
terms of relationships, from then onward.
Developments and Manifestations in the Everyday
Lives of Adolescents
Next, I will introduce the impact that these cultural,
family and social changes may entail in the world of
adolescence. I do not intend to exhaust the theme, but to at
least stress some aspects that seem relevant to me as
important systems that organize the world of adolescence
(Klein, 2006).
One such aspect has to do with how new family systems
emerge from shifting models of parenthood, and how
parenthood cannot help but impact the place that young
people occupy as children (“exacerbated messiah complex”
phenomenon). On a related topic, I will outline a dimension
that I consider essential to understanding contemporary
adolescent subculture (the fraternal order). 
The clinical stories that follow come from a therapy
group I coordinated 19 years ago in the Area of Adolescence,
Psychotherapy Program of Clinical Psychiatry in the School
of Medicine. As I already mentioned in I), they are simply
presented as a rich way of developing my hypotheses. In
no way do they attempt – within the limits of this essay –
to serve as empirical evidence. 
On the exacerbated messiah complex or spending all one’s
time “care taking.”
D. I…(…)…have to be serious, doing your work, you
can’t get out of it because you have siblings, you have to
take care of them and you can’t do what you really want
to do.
L. I don’t think it is because one is better and the other
worse. Parents always have an image of how their children
should be, they have demands (…). 
A. – Other people make decisions for me. I have always
been very attached to my family, they always say yes and
when they say no, I feel lonely, like they have pushed me
aside…My boyfriend always tells me I do not need them
to take care of me, I need them to help me.
P. – You are responsible, you do things well, and they
are going to go well… 
D. – Other people want to put the responsibility on
you because you are older.
L. – To older siblings, greater responsibility, to younger
siblings, less responsibility…
P. – If they leave, I have to take care of the house and
my neighborhood is really bad. At night, there is a
gang…That is why I am big. 
L. – That might be, but in my case, I don’t have to take
care of the house and it’s the same.
D. – I have two younger brothers and I work next
door to the house. My neighborhood is also tough and I
have to leave every 15 minutes to see if everything is
okay.
P. – If my parents and my sister leave, I stay outside
with one or two friends and turn my music all the way up,
but I don’t feel afraid.
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D. – A professor said that we do not take care of the
chairs because they are public, but that it they were
privatized, we would take care of them, and I agreed but
could not tell my friends.6
The above fragments demonstrate what I would call
subjectivity or adolescence “on tip-toes.” That means –
among other things – less familial tolerance of mood
problems, conflicts, rebellion, or opposition behaviors: “I
have to be serious, to do my work, you can’t get out of it
because you have siblings, you have to take care of them
and you can’t do what you really want to do.”
The needs of a baby are given the incentive, seeking to
be protected and contained, as long as that reality remains
clandestine. Instead of there being an existential continuity,
there is more of an existential split. It is one thing to be
with one’s friends and another to be with one’s parents. With
them, certain behavior is “expected” from an adolescent,
while around the family, close relationship ties unfold.
The regressive need to be contained makes the adolescent
appear dangerous in the face of the “loss” of that contact
which, for them, is crucial.  Their extreme need to be cared
for makes it such that, paradoxically, the ones who show
themselves to be lacking are cared for most.  
One aspect of this type of subjectivity is what they
transmit with their upset feelings: They can no longer stop
taking care. This situation speaks to the poor state of the
communication of obligations, while the right to do other
activities is not recognized. In this way, the possibility of
learning to take care of oneself is restricted. 
Together with permanent care, an anxious flurry of active
interpretation is implemented, which detects signs of rejection
and/or belonging, seeking to understand the codes by which
they may be incorporated into family and/or social
relationships (“You are responsible, you do things well and
they are going to go well…”) On the other hand, however,
in these groups, the conditions of belonging are rigid
(“Parents always have an image of how their children should
be, they have demands (…).”
One behavior that expresses the above is what is referred
to as the exacerbated messiah complex. As I already
mentioned in earlier studies (Klein, 2003), the messiah
complex (a concept driven by Kancyper, 1992, 1997) is a
structural activity of adolescence: 
In some way, its presence ensures a persistent investment
on the part of the family, beyond the changes of this period
(…) It could be said, then, that if “the baby’s majesty” is an
inescapable structural condition, “its messiah, the adolescent,”
should be no less (Klein, 2003, p. 124).
In this way, we hope that the adolescent is at once
propped up and neglected through the family, the Oedipus
complex, confrontation, the group of pairs, the messiah
complex, the future, education and other factors. This
situation has a healthy potential given that when one
eventually needs to use crisis and change structures, they
will be in place and flexible, because the psyche will already
have developed the support of multiple factors. The more
multifaceted the subjectivity is (Bernard, 2001), the more
complicated the individual’s psyche becomes.
On the other hand, the material presented suggests that
adolescence, rather than being a threading scene, as an
opportunity for change, comes to be a feared encounter,
making the structures that mediate between the adolescent
and their adolescence more fragile. Thus, there tends to be
only a single support for a frozen scene that allows them
to avoid mounting troubles and reproaches for being
adolescents. 
Losing adolescence is “an intense process of translation
that must be seen as losing supports and later gaining them
back” (Klein, 2003, p. 171). A single-support system is
formed because the problem is that young people do not
know HOW to move between different structures (infancy-
adolescence; adolescence-adulthood).
The material studied gives the impression that the
messiah complex is the only [or predominant] support that
an adolescent possesses to sustain his or her family ties. It
is for that reason that I call it “exacerbated.” Leaving the
messiah complex behind is experienced as a catastrophic
situation that provokes feelings of anxiety in adolescents. 
“Messiah” responsibilities seem to take on a wider and
more centrifuged area every time: taking care of the house,
siblings, chairs, home and family harmony, until the point
when it gives the impression that it is not the adolescent
who “depends” on the world, but the world that depends
on the adolescent. Fraternal bonds become fraternal
“burdens” (“…Other people want to put the responsibility
on you because you are older… To older siblings goes
greater responsibility, to younger siblings, less
responsibility…”). 
The spirit that is conjured to assume this role (or better
said: the word), would most likely be loss; loss of family,
loss of peace, loss of balance or homeostasis for the species,
and so adolescents become guardians. Giving up one’s place
as messiah could entail imminent dangers: robberies (“they
robbed one of the houses next door to mine”), destruction
(“At night, there is a gang…”), accidents (“I have to take
care of my sister because she goes out to the street”)
absences (“She goes with her friends and forgets to be
careful”) and divorces (“I never accepted that my parents
would separate. There were problems between them…”). 
This situation is inseparable from what I call an imminent
catastrophe situation (Klein, 2006). At the same time, it is
tied to another: the unquestionable obligation situation. In
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the latter, if a situation transmits discomfort (“Right, but at
night, it’s: don’t drink, don’t smoke, for that they always
highlight the rules”) and double meaning (“If they leave, I
have to take care of the house and my neighborhood is really
bad. At night, there is a gang…That is why I am big”), they
can do nothing but act “obedient,” which perhaps reflects
the persistent transmission of a dictatorial grammar from
the more or less recent past in so many countries in Latin
America.
This may involve compulsive behavior, maybe in the
style of obsessive ritual (“I have two younger brothers and
I work next door to the house. My neighborhood is also
tough and I have to leave every 15 minutes to see if
everything is okay”) or maybe in an attempt to avoid the
experience of terrible loneliness: “Yes, I have to be alone.
I shut myself up in my room, put the music on loud; if my
parents and my sister leave, I stay outside with one or two
friends and turn the music all the way up, but I don’t feel
afraid.” Trying to avoid the experience of terrible loneliness:
In this way, possible psychic problems are substituted
by an adaptive force. In a sense, they try to nullify conflict
situations by resolving them with force and will power. At
the same time, the situations worsen to become questions
of life or death.
Disobedience comes to be related to experiences of
vulnerability, so adolescents do not feel that they have the
power to change their behavior, and seem resigned and
devitalized. The feeling of “being at someone’s mercy”
implies that subjectivity is regulated largely externally, at
the family or institutional level.
The exacerbated messiah complex is, itself, related to
the impossibility of expressing pain for the family that no
longer exists, to which experiences of protection and care
are associated. This sort of prolonged, “happy infancy” seeks
to deny, more than the end of infancy, the changes in one’s
parents have undergone since infancy. In their place, what
I have called “upset parents” emerge, who transmit feelings
of vulnerability.
Even though protective parents become vulnerable
parents, it is a reality that they can neither accept nor tolerate,
feeling that if that illusion (that they protect and bring
harmony and security) breaks, frightening effects may come
as a result. What relieves and calms them down is for
everything to remain static and unchanging. 
I suggest as a hypothesis-in-progress that the problem
at hand relating to the family is double: on the one hand,
adolescents ask themselves how to get rid of these parents
without feeling guilty. On the other hand, they create a
situation of fusion with the parents, trying to deny the shame
that they provoke in them. 
This situation does not facilitate growth nor does it
change any structures; instead (maybe as a form of
compromise between change and non-change) another side
appears, the exacerbated messiah complex: an accentuated,
overly demanding psychic relationship with the family group. 
In the classic model of Keynesian modernity, family was
the essence of growth. It involved sustaining and
collaborating with the social sphere, a model which ended
up generating viable, vital conditions of “detachment.” In
the passage from endogamy to exogamy, when things are
“sufficiently well-provided for,” they are not internalized as
doubt because doubt does not get transmitted (Volnovich,
2002), it generates survival.
On the other hand, young people transmit difficulty
growing. Instead of facilitating conditions for progress, what
their parents transmit are enigmatic messages (Laplanche,
1987) such as: “something horrible may happen;” “save us;”
“always think of us” and others. 
When young people receive enigmatic messages, they
seem to reinterpret them according to a single code: “the
exacerbated messiah complex.” Using this code, the only
meaning they interpret from enigmatic codes is that they
need to protect their parents, the house, their siblings, the
neighborhood and their school. Above all, the message is
to take care, even when fatigued and confused.
They do not know with absolute certainty who their
father is, how to communicate with their mother, or what
ties unite them to the social sphere, but they do know that
it is imperative to remain alert and to protect. They have
no doubt that, whoever their father is, he is weak and fragile.
I already mentioned that with a weak father, it is very
difficult to experience confrontation, as Winnicott (1972)
describes. In that sense, I believe that the exacerbated
messiah complex is an anti-confrontational structure that
prevents one from placing aggression at the service of
growth.
Notes on fraternity or constant comparison as an element
of adolescent culture. P.’s comments at the beginning of a
session:
I feel like a 19-year-old boy because they order me around,
yet I do what I want. After the age of fifteen is another stage,
except that when I come home (from going out) they always
ask me: “What did you do? Where did you go?” It’s always
the same. “Who were you with?” Adults don’t think that they
were ever kids themselves, that they did the same things, or
different ones.
Coming and going imply rituals through which
prohibitions and permission are constructed. The ritual of
leaving has to do with having to do homework, while
coming home involves an interrogation to know where and
with who they were. The everyday world is shaped as a
world of obligations where the kid experiences strong
interrogation and demands:
P. – You have to study if you are not going to become a
vagabond.
L. – In my case, it is a responsibility that’s internalized as
if by a machine, a machine they program. When you are 15,
it isn’t that they don’t trust you, but that they have to tell you;
now they don’t need to tell you. 
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However, are the rules of the game in the adult world
clearly delineated? I think not, and that a great part of the
force that adults exercise goes toward trying to understand
what they are. In this “anti-moratorium” where obligations
are given incentives, yet it is not always clear what, and
how extensive, they are. What is interesting is that being
eighteen no longer implies legal adulthood: in some matters
it may mean the adolescent is still small and in others too
big. It is worth mentioning that infancy and adolescence
coexist; big and small coexist:
(P.: “There are some matters where I am still little, but in
others, no, I am big,” D.: “Other people want to put the
responsibility on you because you are older”).
However, this ambiguity is part of a world where the
possibility of change is nullified. For that reason, it becomes
necessary to rethink what exactly adolescence is in the
context of an intolerant and institution-based society. Things
are programmed, calculated, lied about, and hidden, and
with no apparent margin for improvisation, newness or
originality. The place of the adolescent, as I have already
mentioned, is to participate in clear and precise activities:
take care of siblings, study, spend time with parents (P.- “If
they leave, I have to take care of the house and my
neighborhood is really bad; at night there is a gang”).
The politics of trial and error that I referred to in my
earlier work as an axis of adolescence is not established
(Klein, 2003). Perhaps the scene feared (or maybe it is
deeply desired) by young people is to become “vagabonds,”
or said another way, to break away from the hyper-adaptation
of care-giving prescribed by the exacerbated messiah
complex. It is definitely true that adolescents undergo a
permanent test to prove they are not vagabonds, so that they
may be worthy of their parents’ love. 
In this scenario, completing one’s obligations guarantees
that the parents are permanently dependent upon them: P:
“…I have two friends that can’t stand to be at home and if
their parents ever leave, they are going to have huge parties
at their houses.”
Thus, one must demonstrate that they are “big,” although
growing up seems to be viewed as a price to be paid, part
of a permanent demand to adapt: P. – “Sunday, I
demonstrated that I’m not a boy, now they trust me; there
was something that needed to be done at work and my father
put me in charge: “At this time, take the car and go to this
place,” and I did it all.”
I would like to remark upon the following point: For
young people, to be a kid means to be a person that cannot
be trusted. To be big, on the other hand, means that a person
can be trusted. This idea seems to be reinforced by parents,
too. Does an adolescent live under constant “interrogation?”
One has to prove that they can be trusted, so there is a need
to do things “well,” which diminishes the possibility of
fighting or argument; conflict becomes very fragile.
From there, a type of adolescence is forged that requires
a calm climate and reconciliation with the parents with no
unpleasantness, conflicts, insults, or confrontations that were
to be expected in the “typical” case of adolescents inhabiting
the Keynesian, modern world. 
At the same time, they transmit feelings of loss,
denigration, deficit, that something is missing, and this may
be related to the fear of not being able to meet the standards
of this demanding world. I ask myself, then, if fear is not
centered on not being able to handle imposed responsibility.
The question becomes to what extent young people can
reconcile their adolescence with a heavy load of
responsibilities.
Consider this aggravator: the situation is such that when
they do not accomplish proposed tasks, they are denigrated
and compared to their parents or to other siblings that can
do it, so the experience of being an adolescent is a
humiliating one.
The prevailing strategy seems to be to live adolescence
“as if” one were actually an adolescent, in other words, by
going to dances, drinking a lot of beer and spending the
weekends more or less intoxicated. It is a state of pseudo-
adolescence, which I define as adherence to adolescence
(Klein, 2006) because it does not transmit that which is
most stirring and significant about adolescence, like psychic
and identity permutations.
On the contrary, what prevails is more of a predictable
caricature of an imaginary social sphere: drinking, sex, and
living on the edge, compulsively. Adolescence is a way of
life, but as I have had the opportunity to develop, it is no
longer a demand of psychic activity (Klein, 2004).
I wonder if parents of these adolescents experience (and
treat) their children using a constant double register: they
go from being marvelous heroes (of the exacerbated messiah
complex) to being deceptive (being compared-the fraternal
system). It is about – as I have already developed – the
existence of an insufficient scopic dimension that causes
oscillations between pride and worry, unable to build
character that can be sustained and protected. 
As could be expected, I take the fraternal system to be
a structure of comparison, comparison of the ideal of
adolescence and adolescence as it actually is. However, I
also believe the relationship between siblings is essential.
R. tells us that he covered his eyes to his sister’s birth,
feeling like he had ceased to exist to his mother.
What is especially interesting to me to clarify is that this
is the source of the argument that if one person is chosen,
it is because some other person is excluded, rejected, or
expelled. It is important to say: The family and/or social
sphere is a closed, small space where not everyone has a
place. Certain people have a place in it and others will never
have one. That is what most characterizes the shift from the
feeling of growing up in an expansive society (characteristic
of Keynesian modernity) to the feeling of being expelled
from a smaller society.
Still, it must be said that fraternity is not only related to
the exclusivity and tanatic associated with resentment and
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the exclusion of social relationships. It also presents a
relevant dimension for the union and health associated with
support and solidarity (Czernikowski, 2003). Na. says:  
I have a brother, my sister is 13, my brother is 21 and I
am in the middle. Like everyone who has siblings, we have
preferences. For me, … (cries) I prefer my older brother. To
me, he has always been, and continues to be, the best.
From this perspective, it is revealed that rejection by
one’s sibling is intolerable. Faced with parental vulnerability,
a fraternal preference is formed as an absolute certainty in
which feelings of care and protection are settled that allow
for the restoration of trust and a certain kind of social tie.
On the other hand, the sibling figure falls below the
articulation of the ideal self as a way to mentally organize
that becomes increasingly dense around unquestionable,
maximally-idealized characteristics (Bleichmar, 1981). It is
an idealized object also idealized within a dimension that
compensates the insufficiency of the scopic provisions of
the parents. 
On the other hand, tanatic fraternity involves strong
feelings of resentment and rancor that reflect disjunction
and the act of coping with being displaced by someone else
who dominates, which entails tremendous stress:
D. – I have a grudge about something. He left us [my
father] when I was three and he had never, never given me a
gift. As a boy, I didn’t celebrate my birthday; I didn’t like it.
L. – I have an adopted cousin and they compare me to her
constantly, saying that she is grown up, she’s already 12, and
that she is pretty…
In this dimension of fraternity, there is a two-way,
intolerable incentive to being constantly compared to others.
It is insisted upon that an adolescent compare their parents
with other parents (their friends’, their boy or girlfriend’s,
etc.) (Freire de Garbarino, 1988), but nothing has been said
of the fact that at the same time, adolescents are repeatedly
compared to other adolescents.  It may be that relief comes
from the introduction of another type of relationship (with
grandparents, for example) where adolescents are accepted
as they are. Na.: “I was talking to my aunt and my
grandmother. I communicate well with my grandmother.”
Conclusions: Adolescents without Adolescence
It is commonplace to hear people comment that
adolescents today are disenchanted, that they do not worry
about anything. Classic, psychoanalytic authors (Hanna
Freud, 1985) repeatedly posit that: the adolescent always
seems to be looking outward, toward some other thing,
“navigating” their personal and intangible world. 
My point of view is diametrically opposed: they are not
looking “outside;” rather, they cannot help but look, think
and worry about the “interior.” In other words, they cannot
stop being attentive to their families, procuring care,
protection or comfort.
In this way, the adolescent world appears to be something
that is constantly falling or being destabilized. What was
once solid and safe has now passed, only to be subjected
to vulnerability and mistreatment. However, there are points
of “resistance” (D. – “I resist having more responsibilities
than I should have”) that allow for possible argument or
opposition.
It seems that what these adolescents consider adolescence
is a complex juxtaposition of spaces of growth and
stagnancy; spaces of being big and spaces of being small;
spaces of very intense rivalry and spaces of constant
negotiation in their internal world.
For that reason, there is no longer – like in modernity
– “markers” that clearly identify a “before” and an “after”
(Dolto, 1990) of adolescence. On the contrary, a dense
geography of the psyche and relationships rules that is
deceiving, ambiguous and at times, insoluble.  Along those
lines, to be an adolescent implies a constant debate about
what they can and cannot do.
I believe that the dependence-independence dyad cannot
be used as a simple descriptor of these adolescents’
experiences. Responsibility is no longer an index of
autonomy; it has come to be grounds for denigrating
comparison. It is fragility in a fluid state (Lewkowicz, 2004). 
Contrary to Keynesian modernity, this adolescence is
not founded on, nor does it tolerate conflict or generational
confrontation. Therefore, a “tenuous,” “fragile” adolescence
is formed, implying a model of subjectivity called
adolescents without adolescence (Klein, 2006). Other social
and subjective factors enter into this model that would be
impossible to elaborate upon here.
Are there examples of fragile adolescence?: non-future,
ominous parents, existential worries, violence. There are
histories and experiences annulled that are never woven into
biography and vulnerabilities become chronic and collapse
into a repetitive spiral. The order of the precarious stands
in the place of adolescent joy (Urribarri, 1990). 
I believe this precariousness comes in three parts: social,
family and at the subjective level. On the social level, it
implies an extreme fragility of working and studying
conditions (transformed neoliberally into the labor and
education markets) that go from representing conditions of
security and continuity to being defined by a threat. The
threat implies a constant sense of uncertainty where
unbreakable situations begin to break.
Precariousness on the family level implies the crumbling
of differentiated places and complementary roles in favor
of unifying structures where fatherhood is inexplicable and
motherhood is distrusted, breaking a pact of essential trust,
to which new elements can add and articulate themselves.
The family space begins to incorporate secrets, confusing
situations and exclusionist attitudes.
Finally, at the subjective level, precariousness implies
(among other factors) that growth is experienced as extreme
responsibility, like an irritating task imposed as a kind of curse.
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